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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ultimately, this case is about a business transaction gone awry, leading to 
Mr. Bennett being imprisoned for an alleged breach of contract. However, the State 
contends that this is a theft because Mr. Bennett was not entitled to take the trailer from 
the property which Mr. Bennett had asked Mr. LeFave to bring the trailer. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State argues that Mr. Bennett was not allowed to move 
the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property, where Mr. LeFave had locked up the trailer, until 
Mr. Bennett had paid for the trailer. (Repondents' Brief, p.7.) Because Mr. Bennett 
moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's knowledge or consent and without paying in full 
or returning the trailer, the State asserts that it provided sufficient evidence to convict 
Mr. Bennett of theft. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
This Reply is necessary to address the following arguments made by the State: 
First, the State argues that the broader policy against imprisonment for debt recognized 
in State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 642, 945 P.2d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 1997) is not 
applicable to this case because this case is factually different and, unlike Mr. Henninger, 
Mr. Bennett was charged with general theft. This assertion is incorrect because the 
Idaho State Constitution expressly prohibits imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt 
and the policy expressed in Henninger and as well as other Idaho cases against 
imprisonment for debt is clearly applicable to this case. Second, the State asserts that it 
demonstrated that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property, because Mr. Bennett took 
the trailer off Ms. Elligner's property without Mr. LeFave's permission; however, the 
State still failed to demonstrate how any taking by Mr. Bennett was wrongful because 
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the trailer was already in Mr. Bennett's possession. Finally, the State argued that it 
demonstrated that Mr. Bennett possessed the requisite intent to not pay for the trailer by 
providing evidence that Mr. Bennett moved the trailer and eventually did not finish 
paying for the trailer or return the trailer. Mr. Bennett contends that, despite the State's 
assertions otherwise, it failed to prove that at the time Mr. Bennett took the trailer he 
possessed the requisite intent. 
Mr. Bennett refers this Court to the Appellant's Brief for his arguments regarding 
the remaining issues addressed by the State. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Bennett's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding 
Mr. Bennett guilty of Grand Theft? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The JUry'S Verdict Finding 
Mr. Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft 
A. I ntrod uction 
In response to Mr. Bennett's argument on appeal that the State failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to support his conviction, the State argues that Mr. Bennett was not 
allowed to move the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property, where Mr. LeFave had locked 
up the trailer, until Mr. Bennett had paid for it. (Repondents' Brief, p.7.) Because 
Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's knowledge or consent and without 
paying in full or returning the trailer, the State asserts that it has provided sufficient 
evidence to convict Mr. Bennett of theft. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State also 
argues that the broader policy against imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt outlined 
in State v. Henninger 130 Idaho 638,642,945 P.2d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 1997), does not 
apply to this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
Mr. Bennett contends that the policy against imprisonment for failure to pay a 
debt absolutely applies in his case and his conviction for general theft for failing to pay 
for the property as agreed is exactly what this policy was designed to prevent. 
Mr. Bennett also contends that the State's argument that by providing evidence that 
Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's consent, it provided sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property in question is incorrect because 
the was already in Mr. Bennett's possession and you cannot wrongfully take something 
you already posses. Finally, the State's argument that it demonstrated that Mr. Bennett 
possessed the requisite intent at the time he took the trailer also fails because the 
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evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Mr. Bennett had recently paid and still 
intended to make payments on the trailer after it was moved. 
B. The Broader Policy Arguments Against Imprisonment For The Failure To Pay For 
A Debt Are Applicable To Mr. Bennett's Conviction For Grand Theft Because He 
Was Essentially Convicted For The Failure To Pay A Debt 
In the Appellant's Brief, prior to discussing each of the missing elements 
individually, Mr. Bennett explained the general policy against enforcing contract 
disputes through criminal proceedings and explained that, by being charged not with 
some type of fraudulent theft, but with general theft, his case was directly at odds with 
Idaho Const art I, § 15 and this policy. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) To support this 
argument, Mr. Bennett cited language from State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 642, 945 
P.2d 864 868 (Ct. App. 1997), as well as other Idaho cases discussing this policy. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) In the Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the 
broader policy discussions outlined in Henninger do not apply to this case because 
Henninger dealt with the failure to make a payment on a secured transaction and noting 
"[W]here, as here, the prosecution 'is intended to deter and to punish actions prohibited 
by statute,' 'it is a proper exercise of criminal law.' (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
However, this argument by the State ignQres Article I, section 15, of the Idaho 
State Constitution which expressly prohibits "imprisonment for debt in this state except 
in cases of fraud." Idaho Const. art I, § 15. Although, at one time, imprisonment for 
failure to pay a debt was an acceptable "private civil remedy," as explained by the South 
Dakota Supreme Court, it quickly became disfavored in the nineteen century. State v. 
Allison, 607 N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D. 2000). By 1853, the United State's Supreme Court 
stated 
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Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. It has 
descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a 
remedy. It is a right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit 
of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and 
dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it 
is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when 
such a blot is removed from the statute-book. 
Id. (quoting Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281,302 (1853)). Today, 
imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt is often forbidden by state constitutional 
provisions like Idaho Const. art I, § 15. Id. Such provisions are designed to protect the 
debtor who cannot pay from imprisonment, but also allow for the prosecution of those 
who act fraudulently or dishonestly. Id. (quoting State v. Madewell, 309 A.2d 201, 204 
(1973)}. 
Therefore, historically, courts have been reluctant to apply criminal culpability to 
a civil breach of a contract. See State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 633 n.10 (N.D. 
1989) (stating that a false promise may not be inferred merely from nonperformance of 
a promise because "the crime of theft of property was not intended as a substitute for a 
breach of contract suit.") (citing Coment on Theft of Property Offenses: § 1731-1741, 
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol 
2, p.925 (1970)); Wojahn v. Halder, 39 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1949) (noting that although 
imprisonment for debt is forbidden by the Minnesota State constitution, imprisonment for 
fraud in contracting a debt was acceptable stating "[t]he imprisonment in such case is 
for the fraud and not for the debt"); State v. Ripley, 889 So.2d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 
2004) (stating "[t]his case is essentially a civil breach of contract case arising out of the 
failure to pay rent. It is paramount that criminal intent, one of the several essential 
elements the state must prove for the crime of theft, be clearly established by the 
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evidence" when finding the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's 
conviction); State v. Amanns, 2 S.w.3d 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding although the 
evidence presented by the State established a breach of contract, the defendants 
conduct failed "to establish the commission of any offense recognized under our general 
theft statute."); Evans v. State, 508 SO.2d 1205 (Ala. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that 
although the defendant's conduct constituted a breach of contract, it did not constitute 
the crime of theft by deception). See also Commonweatlh v. Hensley, 375 S.E.2d 182 
(Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("[W)hile there was no explicit proscription in Virginia's Constitution 
against imprisonment for debt, it nevertheless was clear that a person could not be 
imprisoned, absent fraud, for mere failure to pay a debt arising from a contract."); 
People v. Ryan, 363 N.E. 2d 334, 337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (cautioning against 
expanding the scope of criminal liability for larceny by false pretenses because there 
was always a danger that the crime could reach into the civil realm of a mere breach of 
contract and stating, "the inference of intent must overcome to a moral certainty an 
implication of mere civil wrong.") Id. 
Much like under the Idaho Constitution, under the Washington State Constitution, 
"one cannot be imprisoned merely for failure to pay a debt," although it is acceptable to 
imprison for fraud. State v. Pike, 826 P .2d 152, 157 (Wash. 1992). In State v. Pike, the 
Washington Supreme Court stated that "general contractual debt cannot support a theft 
conviction" noting that "[w)e are loath to turn the criminal justice system into a 
mechanism for the collection of private debts." Id. See also State v. Sloan, 903 P.2d 
522 (Wash.App. Div 3 1995) ("[B)reach of contract without more does not support 
criminal liability."). 
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In Louisiana, the courts have specifically held that "a defendant lacks the 
requisite intent [to commit theft] when he makes an effort to pay the victim or to honor a 
promise made to him." State v. Saucier, 485 So.2d 584, 585 (La. App. 1986.) In 
Saucier, the defendant had been given the victim's dog to breed. 'd. When it became 
apparent that no dogs would be bred, she stated that she would pay for the dog, but 
never actually paid. She asserted that by attempting to bred the dog, she established 
that she intended to fulfill her obligations and that her failure to pay may give rise to a 
civil suit for breach of contract, but was not criminal theft. 'd. The Louisiana Court of 
Appeals agreed. 'd. 
Similarly, in Cox v. State, 658 SW.2d 668 (Tx. App. 1983), the Texas Court of 
Appeals also found that the evidence established nothing more than a contract dispute, 
stating "[t]he mere fact that one fails to return or pay back money after failing to perform 
a contract, for the performance of which the money was paid in advance, does not 
constitute theft." 'd. at 671. In Cox, the alleged victim contracted with the defendant to 
have some home repair work done, paying the defendant in advance for parts and 
services. 'd. at 669-670. The alleged victim admitted that the defendant performed "a 
great deal of the services" he said he would, but did not complete the job or return any 
of the money. 'd. at 670. The court found that ''the evidence in the present case 
established no more than a dispute over appellant's performance of a kitchen 
remodeling contract." 'd. at 671. The court went on to find that the State failed to 
establish that the defendant had the intent to deprive the alleged victim at the time he 
took the money from her. 'd. 
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Like many of the other States cited above, the Idaho Constitutional provision 
prohibiting imprisonment for failure to pay a debt specifically creates an exception for 
cases of fraud. See Id. Const. art I, § 15. However, Mr. Bennett was not charged with 
any type of fraudulent theft involving misrepresentation or misappropriation of the 
property, but was charged with general theft for moving the trailer before making all of 
the payments. Therefore, despite the State's--assertions otherwise, Mr. Bennett was 
charged and convicted of theft for his failure to fulfill his contractual obligations, which is 
what Idaho Const. art I § 15 was designed to prevent. 
C. There Was Not Substantial Competent Evidence To Conclude That Mr. Bennett 
Wrongfully Took The Property, Because The Property Was Already Lawfully In 
His Possession 
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bennett argued he could not have wrongfully taken 
the trailer when he moved it because it was already in his possession. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.13-14.) Mr. Bennett argued that once Mr. LeFave dropped off the trailer at 
Ms. Elliger's property, the trailer was in Mr. Bennett's possession and was under his 
control to live in, to care for, etc. The State argues that because Mr. LeFave stat~d he 
placed a lock on the trailer hitch and told Mr. Bennett not to move the trailer without 
notifying him, the wrongful taking occurred when Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without 
Mr. LeFave's permission. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) However, this argument still 
ignores the fact Mr. Bennett could not wrongfully take the trailer because it was already 
in his possession and you cannot wrongfully take property that is lawfully in your 
possession. See Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641,945 P.2d at 867. Therefore, the State 
failed to demonstrate that Mr. Bennett's taking of the vehicle was wrongful. 
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D. The State Failed To Prove That Mr. Bennett Wrongfully Took The Trailer With 
The Intent To Deprive The Owner Of The Property Or To Appropriate The 
Property 
Finally, and probably most importantly, the State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett 
wrongfully took the trailer with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to 
appropriate the property. The State argues that it has demonstrated that when 
Mr. Bennett took the property from Ms. Ellinger's property, he intended to permanently 
deprive Mr. LeFave of the property, "a point best illustrated by Bennett's own threat to 
'burn [the trailer].'" (Repondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However this argument is flawed 
because Mr. Bennett made a payment shortly before moving the trailer to Washington 
and again later offered to send payment to Mr. LeFave after he had moved the trailer to 
Washington; therefore, the State failed to demonstrate at the time the trailer was moved 
Mr. Bennett intended to deprive Mr. Bennett of the payment he was entitled to on the 
trailer. 
As Professor LeFave has noted, the defendant's conduct and his mental state 
must coincide for a larceny or theft to be completed. Wayne R. LeFave, Substantive 
Criminal Law, § 19.5(f) (2nd ed. 2003.) Thus, the taking and the intent to steal must 
concur or occur at the same time. Id. ("[O]ne who finds lost or mislaid property and 
picks it up intending to return it to the owner, but who later decides to steal it, cannot be 
guilty of larceny; for the taking and asportation, on the one hand, and the intent to steal 
on the other, do not coincide.") Likewise, the Idaho Courts have also stated that the 
intent required to deprive the owner of his property "must exist at the time of the 
wrongful taking or stealing." State v. Bassett, 86 Idaho 277, 385 P.2d 246 (1963). See 
also Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51,501 P.2d at 735. Therefore, at the time Mr. Bennett took 
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the property, which according to the State was when it was moved from Ms. Ellinger's 
property, Mr. Bennett had to possess the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave. 
Here, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Bennett possessed the 
intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the payment he was due under the contract at the time 
he moved the trailer. According to Ms. Ellinger, the trailer was placed on her property, 
after she gave Mr. Bennett permission to do so, in October/November and a month or 
two later, the trailer was moved. (Tr., p.B2, L.16 - p.B4, L.2.) Mr. LeFave only testified 
that he received a call stating the trailer was not at the property anymore and he went to 
investigate and several months later Mr. Bennett called. (Tr., p.32, L.10 - p.33, L.11.) 
It was after that call that Mr. LeFave sent Mr. Bennett the demand letter. (Tr., p.33, 
Ls.9-11, p.34, Ls.5-B.) Likewise, Mrs. LeFave remembered receiving a payment from 
Mr. Bennett, but could not remember when, stating "The fall. That's about the extent of 
what I remember." (Tr., p.73, Ls.19-22.) Notably, Mr. LeFave admitted that Mr. Bennett 
did offer to pay for the trailer when he called requesting the title. (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3; p.39, 
Ls.10-20.) 
Mr. Bennett's testimony also failed to demonstrate his intent to deprive 
Mr. LeFave. According to Mr. Bennett, the payment to Mrs. LeFave was made on 
November 17, 2004. (Tr., p.101, Ls.10-23.) Additionally, Mr. Bennett testified that he 
had already moved the trailer to a new location, with Mr. LeFave, prior to dropping off 
the money to Mrs. LeFave, and he moved to Washington immediately after giving the 
money to Mrs. LeFave. (Tr., p.111, L.22 - p.113, L.B.) He also testified that he called 
Mr. LeFave from Washington asking for the title on December 20, 2004, well after he 
had moved to Washington. (Tr., p.115, Ls.1-7.) Therefore, the State's evidence failed 
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to prove that Mr. Bennett had the intent to steal the trailer and not continue to make 
payments, at the time he took the trailer. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand 
theft with a persistent violator enhancement because there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction. Alternatively, he requests that this Court order that his judgment 
and commitment order be corrected to properly reflect a single sentence, rather than 
separate concurrent sentences for grand theft and persistent violator. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2008. 
ARLSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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